Research
My research primarily concerns the metaphysics and epistemology of perceptual experience, focusing upon:
the nature and role of perceptual experience and representational content
multisensory perception and the individuation of the senses
the spatial and temporal structure of experience across different sensory modalities.
All of these themes were combined in my Synchronising the Senses project, funded by the John Templeton Foundation via the University of Cambridge’s New Directions in the Study of the Mind initiative.
Other interests
My other research interests include:
philosophy of psychology and cognitive science
epistemology, particularly of perception
the metaphysics and consciousness of time and temporal passage (on which I wrote my MLitt dissertation)
the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Thomas Reid, on whose account of visual perception I have published.
Projects and collaborations
Postdoctoral researcher on the Perceiving Representations project at the University of Oslo, where I conduct empirically-informed research in the metaphysics and temporal structure of perceptual experience (2019–2023)
Collaborator on the Perceiving Properties in a World of Objects project, University of Oxford (2019–2021)
Postdoc on the Rethinking the Senses project, University of Glasgow (2014–2017)
Awarded John Templeton Foundation research funding via the University of Cambridge’s New Directions in the Study of the Mind initiative in 2017 for a project on the temporal structure of experience, which continues to form a central focus of my research
Co-edited a special issue of the journal Topoi on Perception Without Representation with Roberta Locatelli of the University of Tübingen (2017)
Co-author of the Oxford Bibliographies entry on the senses with Fiona Macpherson, University of Glasgow (2018)
In my PhD thesis I argued that constraints upon our ability to recognise the contents of our experience rule out many apparently plausible accounts of experiential content and phenomenal character, i.e. what perceptual experience is subjectively like, the central argument from which is summarised in my paper on ‘Are the Senses Silent? Travis’s Argument from Looks’. I argue in a follow-up paper that representational content is recognisable to the subject, with important implications for the metaphysics and epistemology of perception.
